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CONTRACTS-INTERPRETATION-WRITING AND PRINTiNG.-B. F. STURTE-
VANT Co. v. FIREPROOF FILM Co., N. Y. L. 3., DECEMBER I, 1915 (CT. OF
APPEALS).-The plaintiff sent a contract to defendants, typewritten upon
their office stationery, at the bottom of which were printed in small type
certain conditions and exceptions to which no reference was made in
the body of the contract. Held, such conditions and exceptions do not
become part of the contract.
Where part of a contract is written and part is printed, and the written
and printed parts are apparently inconsistent or there is reasonable doubt
as to the'sense and meaning of the whole, the words in writing will control
the construction of the contract. 6 Ruling Case Law, p. 847; City of
Chicago v. Weir, 165 Ill. 582; Mansfield Mach. Works v. Lowell Common
Council, 62 Mich. 546. The reason for the rule is, that the part which is
specially put into a particular instrument is naturally more in harmony
with what the parties intend, than the other. Daly v. Busk Tunnel Ry.
Co., 129 Fed. 513; Joyce v. Realm Marine Ins. Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 58o. The
courts are agreed that if reference be made in the contract to written or
printed terms contained in another instrument, such instrument becomes
part of the contract; a fortiori, then, reference to printed matter, con-
tained on the same paper as the contract, will make the matter referred to
a part of the contract. Barton v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 84 S. C. 209. If the
written and printed portions be not inconsistent and irreconcilable, they
must be made to harmonize. Soucy v. Obert Brewing Co., i8o Ill. App.
69; Wheeling R. R. Co. v. Gourley, 99 Pa. St. 17i. In the instant case,
the court seems reasonably to have been influenced by the fact that the
typewritten words appeared above the printed form, and the page number-
ing intervened. But since there is a positive duty on the court to construe
the contract on a consideration of the whole instrument and not on
detached portions, and since, further, it was possible to harmonize the
two, the court should have made an attempt to do so. The printed form
adopted for general use should be disregarded only so far as it appears
that it was the intention of the parties to change or reject such printed
stipulation. See Frost's Detroit Lumber, Wooden-Ware Works, etc. v.
Miller's, etc., Ins. Co., 37 Minn. 3oo. A.N.
DAMAGES-PERSONAL INJURIES-MENTAL ANGUISII-PRxImATE OR RE-
MoTE.-ST. MARIN v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 94 ATL. (CONN.)
279.-Held, that mental anguish due to plaintiff's inability to be with his
dying wife and subsequent remorse at her grave because he was unable
to see her before her death are too remote elements of damage to be con-
sidered in an action for personal injuries.
The general rule has come to us from England that mental anguish and
suffering resulting from negligence unaccompanied by injury to the person
cannot be the basis of an action for damages. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L.
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Cases 577; Hokks v. R. R., L. R. io Q. B. 122. Such is the rule to-day
in all actions ex contractu and ex delicto, with modifications. Mentzer v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752. Considering that sufferings of mind and
body usually act reciprocally on each other, damages are allowed for
mental suffering consequent upon physical injury. Seger v. Town of
Barkhamstead, 22 Conn. 290. Still it must result directly from the injury
or be the natural and proximate consequence of it. Sullivan v. Ry., 197
Mass. 152; Chicago City Ry. v. Anderson, 182 Ill. 298. The courts, how-
ever, are divided in deciding what mental suffering is to be considered
proximate, the difficulty seeming to arise as to the causal connection
between the injury and the resultant damages. It has been held that
mortification due to one's appearance ds a result of the injury is sufficiently
allied to allow recovery. Gray v. Wash. Water Power Co., 36 Wash. 665;
but contra, Linn v. Luquesne, 204 Pa. St. 511; So. P. Co. v. Hetzu, 135 Fed.
274. However, the courts seem to be unanimous in disallowing recovery
where the anguish arises from worry concerning matters apart from the
injury, which, although they may affect him, are caused by some conception
arising from a different cause. Chicago v. McLean, - Ill. -; Keyes v.
Ry., So Minn. 29o; Atchison Ry. Co. v. Chaner, 57 Kansas 41. The prin-
cipal case seems to follow the authorities, which draw an artificial line
where facts similar to its facts exist. In drawing this line the courts
consider the mental anguish as too remote, although primarily caused by
the defendant's acts.
J. McD.
DEATH-CoNTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PARENT.-DABRINSKY v. PENN.
Co., 94 ATL. (PA.) 269.-Held, contributory negligence of one parent will
bar recovery by the other parent for the death of their minor child, the
negligence of the parent in charge of the child being imputed to the parent
who seeks to recover.
The administrator of the estate of a deceased child may recover damages
for its wrongful death though the parents or other persons having charge
of the child were guilty of contributory negligence. City of Birmingham v.
Crane, 56 So. (Ala.) 723. And this is so though the parent may be the
sole distributee of the child's estate, Nashville Co. v. Busbee, 139 S. W.
(Ark.) 3O1, and may be himself acting as administrator. McKay v. Syra-
cuse Ry. Co., 2o8 N. Y. 359; Southern R. R. v. Shipp, 53 So. (Ala.) I5O.
But on the other hand Illinois holds that in a suit by the administrator
for the death of a child the right of the administrator to recover is barred
by the contributory negligence of the child's parents. Ohnesorge v. C. C.
R. R., 259 Ill. 424; Thomas v. Anthony, 179 Ill. App. 463. In such a case
if the parent is the real beneficiary, his contributory negligence will be
imputed to the child, though the action is by the administrator. Feldman
v. Detroit Ry., 162 Mich. 486. As to the exact point of the principal case
there is a square conflict of authority. For contrary holdings see: Donk
C. & C. Co. v. Leavitt, iog Ill. App. 385; Phillips v. Denver Grain. Co.,
53 Colo. 458 (wife suing as co-plaintiff); Potts v. Union Traction Co.,
83 S. E. (W. Va.) 918; Love v. D. I. & C. R. R., 135 N. W. (Mich.) 963.
See also, Vinnette v. N. P. R. R., 91 Pac. (Wash.) 975; Kuchler v.
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Milwaukee R. & L. Co., 146 N. W. (Wis.) 1133. The principal case
seems out of harmony with the weight of authority.
S. B.
EMINENT DOMAIN-VACATION OF ALLEY-COMPENSATION AS A CONDITION
PRECEDENT-TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.-HuBBELL Lr AL. V. CITY OF
DES MOINES, 153 N. W. (IA.) 337.Held, that where a coliseum, used for
assembly purposes, abutted on an alley on which it had no exits, these
being located on other streets, and the city vacated such alley, by an
ordinance devoting the land to park purposes, payment by the city to the
owner of the building of compensation for damages sustained by him by
vacation of the alley was not a condition precedent to vacation, since such
vacation of a street is not a "taking of private property" in contempla-
tion of the constitution.
The general rule deducible from the authorities seems to be that any
destruction, restriction, or interruption of the common necessary use and
enjoyment of property constitutes a taking. Hooker v. New Haven, etc.,
R. Co., 14 Conn. 146; Brinton v. Comm., 178 Mass. i99. The benefits to
be received by the person whose land is taken by the public for a road is
a part of the consideration for release of the land, or its condemnation
for a road. Cochrane v. Comm., 175 Mass. I99. And when once vested
in him, or he becomes entitled thereto, they become appurtenant to the
land, and are as much his property as the land itself; and neither state
nor person can deprive him of it except in the manner prescribed by the
constitution. Pearsall v. Eaton Co., 74 Mich. 558; Gorgan, etc., v. Louis-
ville & New Albany, etc., R. R., 89 Ky. 216; Webster v. Lowell, 142 Mass.
324; contra, McGee's Appeal, ii Pa. St. 470; Levee District No. 9 v.
Farmer, ioi Cal. 178; principal case.
C. Y. B.
EQUITABLE CONVERSION-DISPUTED LEGAcY-SPEcULATIVE PURCHASE BY
EXECUTOR.-COYNE v. DAVIS, 154 N. W. (NEB.) 547.-Held, that land
devised in trust, to be sold to satisfy certain legacies, is personalty in
equity, to the exclusion of the heir-at-law, even after the executrix has
purchased for a nominal sum the valid, but then doubtful, claim of a
legatee thereto. Morrissy, C. J., and Sedgwick and Fawcett, JJ.,
dissenting.
The doctrine of equitable conversion applies only to effectuate the testa-
mentary intention. it re Rudy, i85 Pa. St. 359. If the trustee to sell
acquires but the bequest fails, the trust results to the heir-at-law. Matter of
Wagner, 74 Hun. (N. Y.) 352. Similar in effect is the discharge or release
of a legatee's claim, as this enures to the benefit of the estate. See Hale
v. Aaron, 77 N. C. 371. When an executor buys in the claim of a creditor,
this is presumed to be a payment and not a purchase. Gillett v. Gillett,
9 Wis. i94. In case of a legacy purchased by the executor in his individual
capacity, it is held that only the vendor can attack the executor's interest.
Peyton v. Enor, 16 La. Ab. 135; Hale v. Aaron, supra;. Barton v. Hassard,
3 Drury & Warren's C. L. Cases 461. This doctrine, if sound, extends
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only to a clear case of a purchase by the executor individually. In so
equivocal a transaction as that of the principal case, the heirs should at
least have been allowed the usual presumption in favor of a discharge and
not a purchase.
C. R. W.
INJUNCTION-SUNDAY PICTURE SHOW-ENFORCEMENT OF INVALID ORDI-
NANcE-ADEQUACY OF LEGAL REmEDY.-KLINGER v. RYAN, 153 N. Y. S.
937.Held, injunction will not issue enjoining the chief of police of a city
from arresting the proprietor of a picture show under an invalid ordinance
forbidding Sunday exhibitions, inasmuch as the proprietor has a remedy at
law.
The issuance of an injunction depends primarily on the adequacy of a
remedy at law, for when the latter exists equity will not interfere,
Klinesmith v. Harrison, 18 Ill. App. 467; Willis v. Staples, 30 Hun. (N. Y.)
644. Equity, however, will act where irreparable damage will be done to
plaintiff's business. Hale v. Burns, 91 N. Y. S. 929; Dobbens v. Los
Angeles, 195 U. S. 223. Accordingly a municipality and its officials will be
enjoined from acting under a void ordinance where property rights will
be injured and damages will not compensate. Morris Canal Co. v. Jersey
City, 12 N. J. Eq. 252. It is well settled that police officers will not be
enjoined from performing their duties in excess of general police power,
even though done in an oppressive manner. Sterman v. Kennedy, i5 Abb.
Pr. (N. Y.) 2o; Olympia Ath. Club v. Speer, 29 Colo. i58. Nor even to
the injury of the plaintiff's business by warning the public of its character,
if done in good faith. Gilbert v. Mickli, 4 Sanford Chan. (N. Y.) 357.
It is for the public good that the police officers be allowed to act without
restraint in the performance of their duties, as what might be a trespass
on one occasion would be lawful on another. Pon v. Wiltman, 147 Cal.
28o; Delaney v. Flood, 183 N. Y. 323. If the principal case involved only
the prevention of an arrest there is no doubt that the court acted correctly
in refusing to issue an injunction. Burns v. McAdoo, 99 N. Y. S. 51. On
the other hand, if damages for injury to his business were caused by the
closing of the Sunday picture shows under the invalid ordinance, the
proprietor had an adequate remedy at law against the officer acting under
the ordinance, as he would be liable personally. Campbell v. Sherman,
35 Wis. 103. It is evident that the damages might have been ascertained
and recovered. Allison v. Chandler, ii Mich. 542. On whatever ground
the injunction might have been prayed for, the court acted correctly in
refusing to issue the same.
J. McD.
LIBEL-PuBLICATIoN-WHEN MAILED COImUNICATION IS PUBLISiiED.-
HUTH v. HUTH, 3 K. B. 32, 84 L. J. K. B. i3O7-Held, the fact that a
written communication is sent through the mail in an unclosed envelope
is not of itself evidence of publication, although in fact the contents were
taken out and read by a servant in breach of duty.
The recognized general rule as laid down in Roberts v. English Mfg.
Co., 46 So. (Ala.) 752, is that sending through the mail is not evidence
of publication unless the sender knew that a third party would read the
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communication, or that knowledge of its contents would in the ordinary
course of business be acquired by a third party. Accordingly the mere
writing of a letter by the defendant and sending of it to the plaintiff only,
does not constitute publication, Penry v. Dozier, 49 So. (Ala.) 9o9. But
where it may reasonably be expected that an open communication, as a
post card, will be seen and read by third parties, there the sending is of
itself evidence of a publishing. This is agreed upon by English and
American courts. G. Swinfen Eady, L. J., in the principal case, quoting
Sadgrove v. Hole, 2 K B. I, 70 L. J. K. B. 455. Logan v. Hodges, 146 N. C.
38; 59 S. E. 349. The principal case, however, goes on to draw a distinc-
tion in regard to the unclosed envelope, considering it more nearly analo-
gous to the sealed letter than to the postal card. This reasoning would
seem open to question, especially in view of the modem postal distinction
between sealed and unsealed matter. If there were not the implication
that unsealed letters were likely to be read, as in the case of post cards,
there would be no reason for paying first-class mail matter rates to obtain
the privacy resulting from sealing.
C. B.
LICENSES-ORDINANCES-CONsTRUcTION.-McDNALD V. CITY OF PARA-
GOULD, 179 S. W. (ARK.) 335.-Held, an ordinance requiring the payment
of a license fee by operators of vehicles "for transportation of passengers
within the city limits" does not apply to the transportation of passengers
from points within to points outside the city, and vice versa. Kirby, J.,
dissenting.
In construing similar acts, courts have held they do not apply to vehicles
passing through the city, or affect those who haul goods from another
city wherein they are licensed. Bennett v. Borough of Birmingham, 31 Pa.
St. 15; City of East St. Louis v. BuX, 43 Ill. App. 276. But that part of
the business carried on within the municipality is taxable. Morristown-
Madison Auto Bus Co. v. Borough of Madison, 85 N. J. L. 59 (dictum).
Such a tax was held valid against those who came to the city in wagons
every day and sold goods therein. Wonner v. City of Cartersville, 125
S. W. (Mo.) 861. On facts precisely similar to those of the principal
case, other courts have reached a contrary conclusion. City of Carters-
ville v. Blytone, 141 S. W. (Mo.) 701; City of Sacramento v. The Cali-
fornia Stage Co., 12 Cal. 134. There seems to be a direct conflict in the
cases on the point involved, the decisions depending on those extrinsic
facts upon which the court lays stress. The courts which emphasize the
inadvisability of double taxation construe these statutes strictly; the
others, looking to the reason for the imposition of the tax (use of city
streets, etc.), construe them more liberally.
L. S.
LIFE ESTATES-INJURY BY STRANGER-EXTENT AND GROUND OF RECOVERY.
-RoGERS v. ATLANTIC G. & P. Co., IO7 N. E. (N. Y.) 66I.-Held, life
tenant may recover for injury by negligence of a stranger not only to
the life estate but also to the remainder, on the theory of trusteeship.
A number of states allow the life tenant to bring trespass, and the
reversioner to bring case. Burnett v. Thompson, 51 N. C. 210; Bentonville
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R. R. v. Baker, 45 Ark. 252; Lane v. Thompson, 43 N. H. 32o. Some
allow them to join in an action for damages to their separate estates.
Mclntire v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 118 Pa. St. io8; R. R. v. Boyer, 13
Pa. St. 497. But the life tenant may only recover for damages to life
estate. Brown v. Woodliff, 89 Ga. 413. And neither can recover damages
covering the entire injury to both estates. Jordan v. City of Benwood,
42 W. Va. 312; Zimmerman v. Shreeve, 59 Md. 357. The principal case
seems to have gone further than any case, and is in conflict with the last
two cases cited. However, the analogy which the case draws with the
rights of a bailee against third parties, where the bailee is not liable
to the bailor, seems to be sound, and that rule is well applicable to the
state of facts under consideration.
L. S.
TORTS-CONSPIRACY AS IMPARTING ToRTious CHARACTER TO OTHERWISE
INNOCENT ACTS.-CoRNELLIER v. HAVERHILL SHOE MFRs. Ass'N. ET AL., 109
N. E. (MAss.) 643.-In determining the tortious character of picketing
incident to a strike, held, that an act lawful when done by one, may be
rendered unlawful by the fact of being done by many in co6peration.
The fact of conspiracy in the sense of preconcerted agreement cannot of
itself impart a tortious character to harmful acts otherwise legal. Bilaf sky
v. Ins. Co., 192 Mass. 5o4. Nor does the mere magnitude of the harm
done, resulting from the increased number of perpetrators, create a tort
out of what would otherwise be damnunm absque injuria. Gregory v.
Brunswick, 13 L. J. R., C. P1. 34 (hooting at theatre). Cases of boycott
should be distinguished from the principal case, their tortious character
depending upon the successful infliction of the intended harm, and not
upon the numbers engaged except as a means of accomplishing such
infliction. Quinn v. Leath'em, L. R. (igoi) A. C. 495, 538. Numbers may,
however, alter the legal character of the means employed to attain an
end which might by one or a few be accomplished by the same means
with impunity. Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92 ("moral intimidation"
imparted by the force of numbers engaged in picketing). Thus numerous
injunctions have issued against acts not threatening physical injury or
temporal loss, but involving merely "social pressure" and "organized
persuasion." Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492; Murdock v. Walker, 152
Penn. St. 595; Ry. Co. v. Ruef, 12o Fed. (Neb.) 1O2, 121. Contra, People
v. Radt, 15 N. Y, Cr. Rep. 429. For an elaboration of the doctrine of the
principal case see Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 26o.
C. R. W.
TRIAL-VERDICT-JOINT DEFENDANTS-APPORTONMENT OF DAMAGES-
SURPLUSAGE.-RATHBONE V. DETROIT UNITED Ry. Er AL., 154 N. W. (MICH.)
I43.-Held, that in an action against joint defendants, a verdict which
assessed a sum total against both jointly, and then attempted to apportion
the same, was defective, and such apportionment could not be regarded
as surplusage, Bird, J., dissenting.
Damages cannot be assessed severally against joint defendants. Mar-
riott v. Williams, 152 Cal. 705; St. Louis Ry. v. Thompson, i02 Tex. 89;
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Jones v. Grimmet, 4 W. Va. io4. When a jury not only finds issues sub-
mitted to it, but also other matters, the added portions may be rejected as
surplusage, and the verdict as to the rest sustained. Odlin v. Gove, 4!
N. H. 465; Goss v. Sloan, 54 Ill. App. 202. So, costs which have been
erroneously included in a verdict are regarded as surplusage. State v.
Beall, 48 Neb. 817; Tucker v. Cochran, 47 N. H. 54- But no part can
be struck out which is essential in making the finding accgrd with the
issue. Richardson v. Noble, 143 Mich. 546. The courts are divided on
the question of apportionment on facts similar to those of the principal
case. One line of decisions holds that such 'an act on the part of the
jury xenders the verdict defective. Whitaker v. Tatem, 48 Conn. 52o.
The other line, which appears to include the majority of decisions, regards
the apportionment as mere surplusage, and holds valid a verdict stating
the sum total against them jointly. Wash. Market Co. v. Claggett, ig App.
(D. C.) 12; Post v. Stockwell, 34 Hun (N. Y.) 373. The weight of
authority appears rightly to be against the holding of the principal case.
The jury signified the total amount of damages to be assessed against the
defendants, and when it went beyond what it was empowered to do, as
in the case of an erroneous assessment of costs, this apportionment should
have been regarded as surplusage, and the judgment rendered against the
defendants jointly allowed to stand.
J. McD.
